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Protecting Due Process During Terrorism
Adjudications: Redefining “Crimes Against
Humanity” And Eliminating The Doctrine Of
Complimentary Jurisdiction In Favor Of The
International Criminal Court
Daniel N. Clay
“When we sit in judgment we are holding ourselves out as
people—as the kind of a community—that are worthy of this task.
It is the seriousness, the gravity, of the act of judgment which
gives rise to our legitimate and laudable emphasis on procedural
fairness and substantive accuracy in criminal procedure. But
these things focus on the defendant—the one judged. I am
concerned about us who would presume to sit in judgment. Who
are we that we should do this? Whether we intend to do so or not,
we answer this question in part through the way we conduct our
trials.”1



Prof. Daniel N. Clay is currently a Tenure-Track Assistant Professor at Elmira College,
Division of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Departments of Criminal Justice and Legal
Studies. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Criminology and Political Science from Drury
University (2011), a Master of Science in Crime and Justice Studies from Suffolk University
(2015), a Juris Doctor from Suffolk University Law School (2015), and a Master of Laws in
International Criminal Law and Justice from the University Of New Hampshire School Of
Law (2016). Prior to Dr. Clay’s first academic appointment at the University of Alabama,
his legal career included a position with the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit (J. Torruella) who aided in the dissenting opinion in In Re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d 14 (1st
Cir. 2015). In addition to his present academic duties and scholarship on international and
domestic criminal law, Dr. Clay serves on the Board of Directors of an innovative, free online
legal research platform targeting United States federal law.
1. SHERMAN J. CLARK, THE TRIAL ON TRIAL, VOLUME 2: JUDGMENT AND CALLING
TO ACCOUNT 85 (R.A. Duff, et al. eds., 2006).
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INTRODUCTION
A. THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING
On April 15, 2013, at approximately 2:49 p.m., two
homemade bombs made from pressure-cookers, packed with
shrapnel, and hidden in backpacks exploded within feet of the
finishing-line of the Boston Marathon – killing three and
wounding more than 260 others. 1 A four-day manhunt for the
perpetrators of the bombing, involving over “1000 federal, state
and local law enforcement” officers, then ensued. 2 Three days
later, on April 18, 2013, authorities identified two brothers,
Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, as suspects in the attacks. 3
Following their identification, the brothers attempted to flee the
city as police gave chase. 4 In the small Boston suburb of
Watertown, Massachusetts, the chase ended in a shootout with
police in which one of the suspects, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, was
killed and the other suspect, Dzhokar Tsarnaev, escaped. 5
The morning following the escape of Dzhokar Tsarnaev,
April 19, 2013, the Governor of Massachusetts, in what the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit would later
call “an unprecedented move,” issued a “shelter-in-place”6 order
for Boston-proper and the surrounding areas, including

1. A&E Networks, Boston Marathon Bombing, HISTORY.COM, https:// www.history.
com/ topics/ boston- marathon- bombings [https://perma.cc/3WX8-LMLV] (summarizing
the events of the Boston Marathon bombing and the subsequent manhunt).
2. Id.; In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d 14, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2015) (J. Torruella dissenting)
(denying Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s first petition for a writ of mandamus ordering a change of
venue).
3. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d at 30.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. When a “shelter-in-place” order is issued government officials have determined that
the “best place to be safe [from a known threat] is indoors.” Daily Bulletin, There are the
Terms You Need to Know in the Event of a Disaster, DailyBulletin.com,
https://www.dailybulletin.com/ 2016/ 03/ 17/ there- are- the- terms- you- need-to-know-inthe-event-of-a-disaster/ [https://perma.cc/47KX-7P9Z]. During the course of the “shelterin-place,” residents are instructed to “turn off air-conditioner and fan units, seal the gaps
around windows and doors, and listen to the radio for authorities to announce the threat has
passed.” Id. Further, residents are warned: “Do not venture out of your shelter until you are
instructed it is safe to do so.” Id.
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Watertown, effective at 5:45am. 7 As a part of the order, citizens
were confined8 to their homes while Specialized Weapons and
Tactics (“SWAT”) teams were deployed to conduct house-tohouse searches for the suspects within a secured perimeter around
Watertown.9 As the searches began, one resident described her
reaction: “I was more scared of them than anything else . . .
[t]hese were big men in black with guns [, searching while] I had
a 9-year-old hiding under the covers. . . . I have never felt so
powerless in my own home.”10 However, largely due to media
coverage, this fear was not localized to Watertown; instead, by
that morning, it had already spread across the nation. 11

B. TRIAL IN THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION
Immediately following the first bomb blast on April 15,
2013, until Dzhokar Tsarnaev surrendered on April 19, 2013,
national news organizations descended upon Boston and began
providing “nonstop coverage and live updates” of the bombing,
the ensuing manhunt for Dzhokar Tsarnaev, and the door-to-door

7. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d at 30-31. The order extended to Newton, Waltham,
Cambridge, Boston, and the entire MBTA (subway, commuter rail, and bus) systems.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF PUBLIC S AFETY AND SECURITY, AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR THE
RESPONSE TO THE 2013 BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS 7 (2014),
https://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/mema/after-action-report-for-the-response-to-the-2013boston-marathon-bombings.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5WY-94MA].
8. Reports following the shelter-in-place concluded that the order was precautionary
rather than mandatory. Associated Press, Massachusetts Gov. Deval Patrick: Closing City
Amid
Hunt
for
Boston
Marathon
Bomber
‘Tough,’
MASSLIVE,
http://www.masslive.com/news/boston/index.ssf/2014/04/massachusetts_governor_deval_p
.html [https://perma.cc/WZ2B-JDQZ].‘’ However, despite subsequent reports noting the
order was merely precautionary, most citizens obeyed the order believing they did not have
a choice. Id.
9. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF PUBLIC S AFETY AND SECURITY, supra note 8, at 7. The
legality of the searches have since been hotly contested, yet no formal challenges have
succeeded to-date. National Lawyers Guild Massachusetts Chapter, Were the Watertown
Lockdowns Lawful?, MASS DISSENT (Mar. 31, 2015), http:// www.nlgmasslawyers.org
/were-the-watertown-lockdowns-lawful/ [ https://perma.cc/XS35-P7V3].
10. Jaclyn Reiss, Unease Lingers a Year After Manhunt, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Mar.
9,
2014),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/regionals/west/2014/03/09/watertownresidents-question-police-tactics-manhunt-for-bombingsuspects/V2cAugxzqcNvlsP82pLZ2L/story.html [https://perma.cc/YY9C-BA8V].
11. Teresa Welsh, Did the Media Botch the Boston Bombing?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT (Apr. 19, 2013), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/04/19/has-mediacoverage-of-boston-marathon-bombings-been-responsible [https://perma.cc/3WN5-F3B5].
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searches in Watertown. 12 Despite numerous instances of
misinformation motivated by the pressures of the twenty-four
hour news cycle, viewership on the major cable news networks
increased dramatically during the live coverage.13 Specifically,
following the attack, Cable News Network’s (“CNN”) audience
increased by a staggering 194%, averaging 1.2 million viewers at
any given time during daytime hours of the coverage.14 Similarly,
Fox News Channel (“FOX”) increased by 48% to an average of
1.6 million daytime viewers. 15 Combined, CNN, FOX, and
MSNBC broadcast live updates to an average of 3.5 million
viewers during the day and approximately 8 million views during
primetime.16 However, these averages pale in comparison to the
combined reach of other media sources, such as the broadcast
networks (i.e. ABC, NBC, CBS, etc), non-traditional televised
programs (i.e. Jon Stewart), news blogs (i.e. CNN.com), social
media (i.e. Twitter), independent websites, etc. 17 In other words,
within four days following the first bomb blast, most people in
the United States had engaged with at least one news report
regarding the bombing via some form of media source. 18
Following Dzhokar Tsarnaev’s surrender, national media
coverage began to slowly dissipate as the public seemingly lost
interest or was no longer in need of the reassurance and comfort
provided by obsessive media coverage. 19 However, new research
conducted at the University of California at Irving related to
Boston Marathon bombings suggests that engagement with media
coverage during a terrorist attack or mass-shooting may: (1) cause
acute stress symptoms greater than those who were at or near the

12. Id.
13. Lisa Richwine, Despite Error, CNN Gets Ratings Boost From Boston Bombing,
Trails Fox, REUTERS (Apr. 19, 2013, 6:05 PM), https:// www.reuters.com/ article/
entertainmentususaexplosionsbostonm-idUSBRE93I1B320130419
[https://perma.cc/9D43-24KM].
14. Id. CNN’s primetime viewership peaked at 2.75 million viewers. Michael
O’Connell, TV Ratings: Viewership Surges During Cable News Coverage of Boston
Marathon Bombing, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER
(Apr.
16, 2013),
https://
www.hollywoodreporter.com/ live-feed/ tv- ratings- viewership- surges- cable- 440488
[https://perma.cc/X4BZ-63VY].
15. Richwine, supra note 14.
16. O’Connell, supra note 15.
17. See In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d at 41.
18. See O’Connell, supra note 15.
19. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d at 48.
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actual attack; (2) trigger flashbacks to different attacks or the
same attack later in life; (3) encourage subconscious fear
conditioning; and (4) result in chronic stress about the event from
repeated exposure.20 Specifically, the study found that “exposure
to media coverage of the Boston Marathon bombings in the week
afterward was linked to more [emotional harm] than having been
at or near the marathon, even if the stress was not immediately
apparent.”21 In other words, engaging with tragic events, such as
the Boston Marathon bombing, via the media may result in
secondary victimization among a nation’s many viewers.22
Further, engaging with these criminal acts via the media (i.e.
pre-trial reporting or non-objective pre-trial publicity)
statistically results in the cultivation of significant anti-defendant
bias.23 More specifically, media reports present a very condensed
(2-5 minute) recitation of the underlying “facts,” while
emphasizing the most damaging evidence; thus, empowering the
viewer to make a judgment based upon extremely limited
information.24 Even the Supreme Court acknowledged this
phenomena in Rideau v. Louisiana, holding: “‘[f]or anyone who
has ever watched television[,] the conclusion cannot be avoided
that this spectacle, to the tens of thousands of people who saw and
heard it, in a very real sense’ was the actual trial.”25 Predictably,

20. Prolonged Viewing of Boston Marathon Bombings Media Coverage Tied to Acute
Stress, UCI NEWS (Dec. 9, 2013), https:// news.uci.edu/ 2013/ 12/ 09/ prolonged-viewingof- boston- marathon- bombings- media- coverage- tied- to-acute-stress/
[https://perma.cc/SG27-BB8M].
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. Lorraine Hope, et al., Understanding Pretrial Publicity Predecisional Distortion
of
Evidence
by
Mock
Jurors
(2004),
http://luna.cas.usf.edu/
~ruva/
Psychology%26Law/Readings/Hope_Memon_Predecisional_Distortion.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UZ96-4PM7]; Cf. Jeffery R. Wilson & Brian H. Bornstein, Methodological
Considerations in Pretrial Publicity Research: Is the Medium the Message?, 22 J. OF L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 585-97 (1998). “[T]he bulk of the literature [concludes] . . . PTP has a
deleterious effect.” Id. at 593. But see Rob Tricchinelli, Pretrial Publicity’s Limited Effect
on the Right to a Fair Trial, THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE L AW (Spring 2013),
https://www.rcfp.org/ browse-media- law- resources/ news- media- law/ news- media- andlawspring2013/pretrial-publicitys-limited#sthash.zysOBRRC.dpuf
[https://perma.cc/N4DJ-G4QT].
24. Wilson & Bornstein, supra note 24, at 586, 593.
25. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d at 34 (quoting Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963)
(internal quotations omitted)).
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this influence was felt as jury selection began in Dzhokar
Tsarnaev’s trial. 26

C. DUE PROCESS & JURY SELECTION
On February 1, 2015, the 1,373 prospective jurors were
summoned to the U.S. Federal Courthouse in Boston,
Massachusetts to complete juror questionnaires before beginning
the process of voir dire.27 Twenty-four days later, only seventyfive jurors were provisionally qualified to the jury pool. 28 Of the
staggering number of jurors excluded from the pool, their juror
questionnaires are telling of a significant anti-defendant bias in
the Eastern Massachusetts venire (of which only 5% presumed
Tsarnaev innocent); these are just a few of the sample responses
to the questionnaire: “[h]e does not deserve a trial,” “[t]hey
shouldn’t waste the [bullets] or poison; hang them,” “I have
formed the opinion that a convicted terrorist should receive the
death penalty. They’re the enemy of my country,” “[t]here was so
much media coverage, even just the shootout in Watertown. I
watched it on TV. And so I feel like there’s involvement there,
like I think it’s—anybody would think that,” etc. 29 However,
despite overwhelming evidence of significant anti-defendant bias
within the venire, in two-to-one opinions, the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit twice denied Tsarnaev’s petition
for writ of mandamus seeking a change of venue outside of the
Eastern District of Massachusetts.30
Writing for the dissent in both opinions, Judge Juan
Torruella argued, under the circumstances, the majority’s
decision violated Tsarnaev’s constitutional right to a fair trial by
a panel of impartial jurors because every juror within the Eastern
Massachusetts venire had been significantly affected or
victimized by the bombing. 31 Specifically, Judge Torruella noted:
[A] number of . . . residents were not at the Marathon,
did not know anyone at the Marathon, or were not
personally subject to the shelter-in-place order. Still,
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 35-37. These excerpts are derived directly from J. Tourrella’s dissent.
In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d at 16-17.
Id. at 44-45.
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they were nevertheless affected because the entire city
of Boston was the intended victim of the bombings.
That is the whole point of terrorism—not just to kill or
injure a few innocent people, but to make everyone
scared and make everyone believe it could have been
them or that they could be next. 32
Based upon this reasoning, Judge Torruella advocated that the
trial be moved outside of the Eastern District of Massachusetts
and, preferably, the state; therein eliminating bias from the jury
pool.33

D. ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW
This analysis disagrees with Judge Torruella’s opinion inso-far as it implies a defendant charged with terrorism can receive
an impartial jury in the country where the alleged attack occurred.
More specifically, if “the whole point of terrorism [is]—not just
to kill or injure a few innocent people, but to make everyone
scared and make everyone believe it could have been them or that
they could be next,”34 then, because everyone in a target country
can be considered a victim (including prosecutors, judges, and
jurors), venue cannot be properly maintained since victimization
(primary or secondary) naturally creates bias. 35 Instead, this
analysis contends that venue for alleged acts of terrorism should
properly lie with an independent international adjudicatory body
such as the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). However,
presently, the ICC only assumes jurisdiction36 when a member
32. Id. at 44.
33. See id. at 47-48. To this end, Tsarnaev’s lawyers commissioned a survey of
potential jurors in Boston, Springfield, New York City and Washington D.C. to study relative
prejudice. WCVB, 58 Percent of Potential Jurors Say Bombing Suspect Guilty (June 19,
2014), http:// www.wcvb.com/ news/ 58- percent- of- potential- jurors- say- bombingsuspect-guilty/ 26564784 [https://perma.cc/9ZQ9-XEK4]. The survey found 57 percent of
Bostonians, 47.9 percent of New York City residents, 51.7 percent of Springfield,
Massachusetts, and 37.4 percent of Washington D.C. residents already believed Tsarnaev
was “definitely guilty.” Dennis Lynch, Boston Bombing Tsarnaev Trial: Most Prospective
Jurors Believe Suspect Is Guilty, IBT (Jan. 22, 2015), http:// www.ibtimes.com/ bostonbombing- tsarnaev- trial- most- prospective- jurors- believe- suspect- guilty- 1791570
[https://perma.cc/9AMY-NQCR].
34. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d at 44.
35. Id. at 45.
36. “A government’s general power to exercise authority over all persons and things
within its territory.” Jurisdiction, BLACK’S L AW D ICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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State fails to initiate genuine prosecutions of war crimes,
genocide, or crimes against humanity. 37 Thus, to effectuate true
due process (a fundamental human right), the ICC’s jurisdictional
mandate should be extended to implicitly include acts of
terrorism. In advancing this position, this analysis will: (1)
examine competing statutory definitions of “terrorism,”
emphasizing the scope of civilian impact anticipated by statutes
in the United States, the United Kingdom, India, Iraq, and the
United Nations; (2) examine prevailing due process standards of
impartiality and fairness juxtaposed to its application in terrorism
proceedings; (3) examine current subject-matter jurisdiction
limitations of the ICC in terrorism prosecutions; and (4)
ultimately propose the Rome Statute’s definition of “crimes
against humanity” be expanded to implicitly include “terrorism,”
therein providing an impartial venue for terrorism prosecutions.

II. THE FIRST CHALLENGE TO ICC
JURISDICTION: DEFINING “TERRORISM”
Conceptually, terrorism has an ancient lineage tracing to the
Assyrians in the 9th Century B.C. 38 Over time, the concept has
gone through many ideations, with most recent evolution
reflecting a shift from ideological terrorism, which emerged in the
1960s, to religious terrorism following the collapse of the
Communist Bloc in the 1980s.39 More specifically, following the
37. How the Court Works, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT https:// www.icc-cpi.int/ about/
how-the-court-works/Pages/default.aspx#legalProcess
[https://perma.cc/7UKS-JF3Z].
Article 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court anticipates that the Court
will acquire jurisdiction over “the crime of aggression” in the future. ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, Art. 5(1)(d)-(2), https://www.icc-cpi.int/ nr/ rdonlyres/
ea9aeff7- 5752- 4f84- be94- 0a655eb30e16/ 0/ rome_ statute_ english.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T4PX-2QX3] [hereinafter ROME S TATUTE]. While the Assembly of States
Parties have agreed that “a ‘crime of aggression’ means the planning, preparation,
initiation[,] or execution of an act [(i.e. invasion, military occupation, annexation, etc.)] using
armed forces by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity[,] or political
independence of another State,” the Court may not begin exercising subject matter
jurisdiction over the crime until after January 1, 2017 when the Amendment must be
approved by a two-thirds majority of the States Parties to the Rome Statue and ratified by at
least 30 States Parties. ICC, UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL C RIMINAL COURT,
https:// www.icc-cpi.int/ iccdocs/ pids/ publications/ uicceng.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A24SVXB].
38. HARRY R. DAMMER & JAY S. ALBANESE, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS 241 (5th ed., 2014).
39. Id. at 242.

2019 REDEFINING “CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY” 579
Cold War, “certain states [(primarily in the Middle East and
Southeast Asia)] [were left] in unstable or anarchic conditions,
[which gave] impetus to the rise of new set of extremists whose
ideology or motivations allow, or even call for [ ] indiscriminate
targeting [of civilian populations].” 40
Yet, despite the rise of indiscriminate targeting of civilians
following the Cold War and major attacks on “Western” cities
(i.e. 9/11, the London Underground bombing, the Paris shootings,
and the Belgium bombings), there remains no universally
recognized definition of “terrorism.” 41 As such, legal dictionaries
generally adopt broad definitions of “terrorism,” to capture
differing, modern conceptions of the term. 42 Thus, definitionally,
the term “terrorism” is most commonly interpreted by both States
and tribunals through the lens of their respective experiences,
cultures, and values. 43
However, while such flexibility may permit States to tailor
definitions to specific threats, this lack of uniformity may be
irreconcilable across borders and result in an “unmooring from
[traditional] rule of law principles.” 44 Specifically, given the
flexibility of the term “terrorism,” states may adopt criminal
codes that share “common core elements, such a condemnation of
the purposeful killing of civilians,” however, ancillary elements
in the definition (i.e. motivation) is largely based on each State’s
own experience with terrorism. 45 As such, to truly understand the
definition of “terrorism,” one must examine its codification
40. John Moore, The Evolution of Islamic Terrorism: An Overview, PBS: FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/ wgbh/ pages/ frontline/ shows/ target/ etc/ modern.html
[https://perma.cc/LZV9-GXYN].
41. GRANT N IEMEN, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL L AW 176 (2014).
In part, this lack of a consist stems from Cold War sentiment that “one [man’s] terrorist is
another [man’s] freedom fighter,” which, according the American Psychology Association,
accurately defines the perspective that both victims and perpetrators adopt when confronted
with a violent act. Tori DeAngelis, Understanding Terrorism, 40 MONITOR ON
PSYCHOLOGY 60, 60 (2009); Sudha Setty, What’s in a Name? How Nations Define
Terrorism Ten Years After 9/11, 33 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 1, 7 (2011).
42. For example, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “terrorism” extremely broadly as
“[t]he use or threat of violence to intimidate or cause panic, esp. as a means of achieving a
political end.” Terrorism, BLACK’S LAW D ICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
43. Id.
44. Setty, supra note 42, at 2 (discussing application of counterterrorism law in the
United States, United Kingdom, and India); R.A. Friedlander, Terrorism, ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL L AW 846 (1999).
45. Setty, supra note 42, at 10-11.
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through the lenses of drastically different cultures and legal
traditions with particular emphasis on the scope of civilian impact
anticipated by each applicable definition. Thus, this analysis
examines Western definitions of “terrorism” (i.e. the United
States and the United Kingdom), South Asian definitions (i.e.
India), Middle Eastern definitions (i.e. Iraq), and the prevailing
universal definition (i.e. the United Nations).

A. WESTERN PERSPECTIVES
The United States Code, relatively concisely, defines
“international terrorism” as:
[V]iolent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of
any State, or that would be a criminal violation if
committed within the jurisdiction of the United States
or of any State; [and] appear to be intended . . . to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence
the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
or to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping . . . .46
While this definition is relatively restrained, the United States
only ranks thirty-second on the Global Terrorism Index of
countries most likely to be affected by terrorism;47 a fact reflected
by a restrained definition emphasizing small groups/sects within
the general population (note the language: “a population” as
opposed to “the population”).48 One legal commentator suggests
this emphasis – absent significant losses of civilian life – is
premised upon the belief that “the political goals of terrorists are
often contrary to the vital interests of democratic countries,
including the United States and its closest allies.” 49 In other
words, the United States’ definition of “terrorism” is largely
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1)(A)-(B) (emphasis added). Similarly, 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)
provides: “the term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”
47. THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX: COUNTRIES MOST AFFECTED BY TERRORIST
ATTACKS, World Atlas (Dec. 9, 2015), https:// www.worldatlas.com /articles /the- globalterrorismindexcountriesmostaffectedbyterrorist-attacks.html
[https://perma.cc/Y3XL-58EN].
48. Id.
49. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN L AW 799 (Kermit L. Hall, et al. eds.,
2002).
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informed by possible future threats to political goals, rather than
as a response to civilian casualties.
Whereas the United States Code largely defines terrorism by
its impact on groups/sects within the population, on the surface,
the United Kingdom emphasizes individual motivation over
impact in that it encompasses both the population as a whole as
well as groups/sects within the population. 50 Specifically, the
United Kingdom’s the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2000,
provides in relevant part:
‘[T]errorism’ means the use or threat of action
where . . . the use or threat is designed to influence the
government [or an international governmental
organization] [sic] or to intimidate the public or section
of the public, and the use or threat is made for the
purpose of advancing a political, religious[, racial], or
ideological cause. 51
However, the United Kingdom has also adopted a supplemental
“catch all” provision – in which both motivation and scope of
civilian impact are irrelevant – providing: “any violent act
committed against another person where a firearm [or explosive
device] is involved may be considered terrorism by the
government . . . .”52 In other words, the United Kingdom has
reserved the right to classify any event involving a firearm or
explosive device as “terrorism” within its sole discretion. 53
Commentators suggest this liberal “catch all” provision may have
been influenced by “numerous internal and external threats to
[it’s] national security and emergency situations over many
decades,”54 placing the United Kingdom thirty-fifth on the Global
Terrorism index – well above the relative security of the United
States and its definitional application. 55

50. Setty, supra note 42, at 31-45.
51. TERRORISM ACT 2000, 2000 c. 11, Part 1, Section 1(1), http:// www. legislation.
gov.uk/ ukpga/ 2000/11/section/1 [https://perma.cc/WBU6-A2Q8].
52. Setty, supra note 42, at 33 (emphasis added).
53. Id.
54. Setty, supra note 42, at 30; GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX, supra note 48.
55. GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX, supra note 48.
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B. EASTERN PERSPECTIVES
While the United Kingdom’s broad definition of “terrorism”
(one that could be arbitrarily applied at the discretion of the
government) has been influenced by numerous internal and
external threats, it pales in comparison to the extraordinary broad
language of India’s prevailing definition (also encompassing the
population as a whole as well as groups/sect) originally codified
in the Terrorist Affected Areas Act of 1984:
‘Terrorist’ means a person who indulges in wanton
killing of persons or in violence or in the disruption of
services or means of communication essential to the
community or in damaging property with a view to –
putting the public or any section of the public in fear;
or affecting adversely the harmony between different
religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes
or communities; or coercing or overawing the
Government established by law; or endangering the
sovereignty and integrity of [the Republic of] India . . .
. 56
In 2008, this definition was broadened even further to
encompass any act “likely to cause” the type anticipated in
the prevailing definition.57

56. TERRORIST AFFECTED AREAS (SPECIAL COURTS) ACT, 1984, NO. 61, §2(1)(H)
ACT OF P ARLIAMENT (1984) http://www.satp.org/ satporgtp/ countries/ india/ document/
actandordinances/ terroristaffectedact.htm [https://perma.cc/ACY7-G5X5 ] (emphasis
added); Setty, supra note 42, at 48.
57. Setty, supra note 42, at 53. Section 15 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Ordinance provides:
Whoever, with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of
India or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in
any foreign country, does any act by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive
substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or
poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances
(whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature, in such a manner as
to cause, or likely to cause, death of, or injuries to any person or persons or
loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property or disruption of any supplies
or services essential to the life of the community in India or in any foreign
country or causes damage or destruction of any property or equipment used or
intended to be used for the defence of India or in connection with any other
purposes of the Government of India, any State Government or any of their
agencies, or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in
order to compel the Government in India or the Government of a foreign
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Legal commentators suggest the breadth of India’s definition
may be even more susceptible to abusive or arbitrary application
than the “catch all” provision of the United Kingdom’s definition;
possibly including traditionally protected activities such as
potentially offensive speech, protest, and assembly. 58 For
example, the publication of Hindu literature urging conversation
among Muslims59 and Christians 60 while advocating Hindu
nationalism, could easily fall within the definition articulated in
the Terrorist Affected Areas Act of 1984, if the publication is
“likely” to “affect[ ] adversely the harmony” between the
religious communities. 61 While this prevailing definition is
severe by Western standards, India ranks eighth on the Global
Terrorism Index and has consistently “struggle[d] with issues
concerning national security . . . since its independence in
1947.”62 As a result, based upon its individual experiences, India
has adopted one of the most broad, fluid definitions of “terrorism”
in modern history that anticipating broad victimization. 63
Paradoxically, Iraq, first on the Global Terrorism Index, 64
has adopted a much more conservative definition of “terrorism”
than India while defining the scope of civilian impact on the
individual and group/sect levels. 65 Specifically, Iraq’s AntiTerrorism Law defines “terrorism” as:

country or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act, commits a
terrorist act.
THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ORDINANCE (2004), http:// www.satp.org/
satporgtp/countries/india/document/actandordinances/the_unlawful_activities__amendord2
004.htm [https://perma.cc/7LRA-6LGD].
58. See generally Setty, supra note 42.
59. 13.4% of the population. CENSUS OF INDIA: RELIGION, Office of the Registrar &
Census Commissioner (2011) http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/religion.aspx
[https://perma.cc/UF6B-MSE8].
60. 2.3% of the population. Id.
61. TERRORIST AFFECTED AREAS, supra note 57. Violent attacks on religious
minorities (i.e. Christians and Muslims) average approximately one per day. Colleen Curry,
Christians and Muslims Face More Persecution by Hindu Extremists in India, Groups Say,
VICE (Mar. 17, 2016) https://news.vice.com/article/christian-and-muslims-are-facingmore-and-more-persecution-by-hindu-extremists-in-india [https://perma.cc/LDR2-Q2A4].
62. GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX, supra note 48; Setty, supra note 42, at 45.
63. Setty, supra note 42, at 45.
64. GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX, supra note 48.
65. Counsel of Ministers, Anti-Terrorism Law No. 13 of 2005 (Nov. 7, 2005) (on file
with author).
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Every criminal act committed by an individual or an
organized group that targeted an individual or a group
of individuals or groups or official or unofficial
institutions and caused damage to public or private
properties, with the aim to disturb the peace, stability,
and national unity or to bring about horror and fear
among people and to create chaos to achieve terrorist
goals.66
However, despite the law’s predicate requirement of a “criminal
act,” the definition has been heavily criticized by Shiite
lawmakers who argue the law was created with too much Western
influence (particularly by former occupying forces, such as the
United States, that still retain a significant stake in Iraq’s
legislative process). 67 Specifically, following the United States
led invasion in the Summer of 2003 until the withdrawal of the
United States’ military presence in 2011, coalition forces were
responsible for all governance as well as the creation and
implementation of the post-withdrawal legislative structure. 68
However, many within Iraq’s post-coalition government,
including Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak, suggest
American influence was nonexistent at the time of Iraq’s AntiTerrorism Law;69 though this position largely seems untenable
given the striking similarities between Iraq and the United States’
definition of “terrorism” (excepting its anticipated civilian
impact).70

66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Iraqi Parliament Passes Anti-Terror Law, CHINA D AILY (Oct. 5, 2005), http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/ english/ doc/ 2005-10/ 05/ content_ 482721. htm
[https://perma.cc/8ECB-DZ3V]; Iraq: A Broken Justice System: Ten Years After Invasion,
Opponents Punished, Trial Rights Ignored, H UMANS RIGHTS WATCH (2010),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/31/iraq-broken-justice-system [https://perma.cc/RZ2FET7X] (noting claims that “officers and judges use the country’s anti-terrorism law to harass
innocent civilians.”).
68. See generally Katia Papagianni, State Building and Transitional Politics in Iraq:
The Perils of a Top-down Transition, 8 INTERNATIONAL S TUDIES PERSPECTIVES 253, 253–
71 (2007).
69. See Ernesto Londoño, A Decade After Iraq Invasion, America’s Voice in Baghdad
Has Gone From a Boom to a Whimper, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2013), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/ world/ national-security/ a-decade-after-iraq-invasion-americasvoice-in-baghdad-has-gone-from-a-boom-to-a-whimper/ 2013/ 03/ 23/2f334826-930311e2-a31e-14700e2724e4_story.html [https://perma.cc/FJH6-G2QE].
70. Id.
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D. THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
Not only have individual States struggled to uniformly
define “terrorism” and its impact, but so too have international
bodies.71 One of the first working international definitions of
“terrorism” appears in Article 33 IV Geneva Convention of 1949,
Article 51(2) Additional Protocol I of 1977, and Article 3 and 14
Additional Protocol II of 1977 and anticipates the victimization
applies to civilian populations as a whole (as opposed to
individuals or groups/sects within the population):
[I]ndicat[ing] an act of violence in breach of the
principles of military necessity, proportionality and
distinction, which is primarily aimed at spreading fear
among the civilian population. . . . contain[ing] the
same elements of the definition used in the common
language: the element of innocent victims (civilians), a
violent act and the existence of a political end which,
however, does not justify the means, because of their
disproportionality.72
Comparatively, “[o]ver the course of four decades, the
international community, under the auspices of the United
Nations, has developed 13 conventions [on] the prevention and
suppression of terrorism.”73 Specifically, in 1994, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 49/60
(Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism)
which expanded upon the Geneva Convention’s definition to
include individuals, groups, and the population as a whole:
‘[C]riminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a
state of terror in the general public, a group of persons
or particular persons for political purposes’ and that
71. See generally BEN S AUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010).
72. Roberta Arnold, The Prosecution of Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity, 64
ZAÖRV 979, 989 (2004), http://www.zaoerv.de/64_2004/64_2004_4_a_979_1000.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YFG4-UNSQ].
73. Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: Fact Sheet No. 32, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN R IGHTS 13 (2008),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/48733ebc2.html [https://perma.cc/VJ27-UA8K] [hereinafter
HCHR].
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such acts ‘are in any circumstances unjustifiable,
whatever the considerations of a political,
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or
other nature that may be invoked to justify them. 74
Ten years later, in 2004, the United Nations Security Council
again revisited the definition (without changing the scope of
application), providing in Resolution 1566 (2004) “terrorism”
includes:
Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed
with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury,
or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a
state of terror in the general public or in a group of
persons or particular persons, intimidate a population
or compel a Government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. 75
However, that same year, the Secretary-General’s High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change scaled back the
definition (i.e. the application to individuals) to: any act “intended
to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or
noncombatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government
or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any
act . . . .”76 Interestingly, both of the 2004 definitions are
remarkably similar to the United States’ definition of “terrorism”
codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1)(A)-(B) and 22 U.S.C. §
2656f(d)(2) both in language and anticipated civilian impact. 77
As of 2016, the definitions articulated by the General
Assembly in 1994, the Security Council in 2004, and the
Secretariat in 2004 are the most current working international
definitions of “terrorism.”78 However, since 2005, the Sixth
Committee (Legal) of United Nations (“Sixth Committee”) has
been drafting a comprehensive convention against terrorism

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
Id (emphasis added).
Id (emphasis added).
See Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A)-(B) (2012); 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012).
Various Definitions of Terrorism, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY AND
MILITARY AFFAIRS, https:// dema.az.gov/ sites/ default/ files/ Publications/ AR-Terrorism
%20Definitions-BORUNDA.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MV7-GPJ6].
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designed to augment the existing legal regime on the topic.79 In
its most current draft, the Committee defines the scope of
“terrorism” as a group/sect within the general population:
‘[U]nlawfully and intentionally’ causing, attempting or
threatening to cause: ‘(a) death or serious bodily injury
to any person; or (b) serious damage to public or private
property, including a place of public use, a State or
government facility, a public transportation system, an
infrastructure facility or the environment; or (c) damage
to property, places, facilities, or systems. . ., resulting or
likely to result in major economic loss, when the
purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to
intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or
an international organization to do or abstain from
doing any act.’80
Yet, despite the Security Council’s recognition that the adoption
of a universal anti-terrorism instrument, including a universal
definition, as a “top priority,” 81 debate over the proposed
definition’s bearing upon liberations movements continues to
stall its adoption. 82 Specifically, the Organisation of Islamic
Cooperation (the second largest inter-governmental organization
after the United Nations) has opposed and obstructed any
definition that does not “distinguish between acts of terrorism and
the legitimate struggle of peoples under foreign occupation and
colonial or alien domination in the exercise of their right to selfdetermination.”83 In response to these demands, the General
Assembly has since “reaffirmed the right to self-determination
and independence of all peoples [by upholding] the legitimacy of
national liberation movements . . . [while] mak[ing] it clear that
this does not legitimate the use of terrorism by those seeking to
79. Agreed Definition of Term “Terrorism” Said to be Needed for Consensus on
Completing Comprehensive Convention Against It, UNITED N ATIONS (Oct. 7, 2005),
https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/gal3276.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/S7F3-FJ88].
80. HCHR, supra note 74, at 6.
81. Id. at 14.
82. Id. at 6-7.
83. History, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION, https://www.oicoci.org/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en [https://perma.cc/Z6SW-DS8K]; Rohan Perera,
Oral Report of the Chairman of the Working Group on Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism, HUMANS R IGHTS VOICES (Nov. 13, 2015), http:// www.humanrightsvoices.org/
assets/
attachments/
documents/
11.13.2015.
Eliminate_
Intl_
terrorism_Chair_Wkg_Grp.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BG9-FYVG].
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achieve self-determination.”84 Thus, the adoption of a universal
anti-terrorism instrument remains in legislative limbo.
However, unfortunately, given the most current draft of the
Sixth Committee, statutory definitions appear to be trending
towards an anticipated impact upon groups/sects away from the
Geneva Conventions’ recognition that even “targeted terrorism”
against small groups affects populations as a whole. 85 Thus, as a
result, the final draft of the Sixth Committee must acknowledge
the broad impact of even “targeted terrorism” in order to justify
international jurisdiction.
In the interim, there will be no prevailing, universal
definition of “terrorism.”86 This void has been expressly
condemned by the United Nations’ High Commissioner for
Human Rights who notes: “[c]alls by the international community
to combat terrorism, without defining the term, might be
understood as leaving it to individual States to define what is
meant by it. This carries the potential for unintended human
rights abuses,”87 including violations of internationally
recognized norms in due process.88

THE SECOND CHALLENGE TO ICC
JURISDICTION: DEFINING A “FAIR TRIAL”
A. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS
Despite the lack of a prevailing definition of “terrorism,”
there is an international consensus that due process, including the
right to a fair and impartial trial, predicating a criminal conviction
is a fundamental human right. 89 Specifically, 170 countries,
84. HCHR, supra note 74, at 41.
85. Arnold, supra note 73, at 980.
86. Id. However, some legal commentators argue that since our Geneva Conventions
of 1949 amount to customary law, the definition of “terror” under Article 33 IV GC could
be used universally until the United Nations adopts a comprehensive convention on
terrorism. Id.
87. HCHR, supra note 74, at 39.
88. Id.
89. HCHR, supra note 74, at 38; Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A
Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers, OFFICE OF THE H IGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN R IGHTS IN COOPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL BAR
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including the United States, have ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), guaranteeing:
“[a]ll persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the
determination of any criminal charge against him . . . everyone
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”90 In its
official statutory comments to the ICCPR, the Human Rights
Committee notes this requirement of impartiality is “an absolute
right that is not subject to any exception.” 91 Specifically, the
Committee concludes:
The notion of fair trial includes the guarantee of a fair [
] hearing. Fairness of proceedings entails the absence
of any direct or indirect influence, pressure or
intimidation or intrusion from whatever side and for
whatever motive. A hearing is not fair if, for instance,
the defendant in criminal proceedings is faced with the
expression of a hostile attitude from the public or
support for one party in the courtroom that is tolerated
by the court, thereby impinging on the right to defence,
or is exposed to other manifestations of hostility with
similar effects.92
To this end, the ICCPR mandates that the trier of fact “must not
allow their judgement to be influenced by personal bias or
prejudice, nor harbour preconceptions about the particular case
before them, nor act in ways that improperly promote the interests
of one of the parties to the detriment of the other” while

ASSOCIATION 215, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training9chapter6en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2M6A-R779] (noting “[e]very person has the right to a fair trial both in
civil and in criminal cases, and the effective protection of all human rights very much
depends on the practical availability at all times of access to competent, independent and
impartial courts of law which can, and will, administer justice fairly.”).
90. Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard: International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, UNITED N ATIONS HUMAN R IGHTS ; OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER,
http:// indicators.ohchr.org/ (subject to several reservations); International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Art. 14(1) (Mar. 23, 1976), http:// www.ohchr.org/ en/
professionalinterest/ pages/ccpr.aspx [https://perma.cc/H2R8-PX4H] (emphasis added).
91. General Comment No. 32, UNITED N ATIONS H UMAN R IGHTS COMMITTEE 5 (Jul.
27, 2007).
92. Id. at 7-8.
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maintaining an outward appearance of the tribunal’s
impartiality.93
The language contained within the ICCPR (opened for
signature in 1966) guaranteeing the right to a fair and impartial
jury was largely derived from the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“European Convention”) (opened for signature in 1950),
providing: “[i]n the determination of . . . any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law.”94 Since the European Convention served as
the model for the ICCRP, cases and statutory interpretations
arising under the European Convention are not only highly
persuasive precedent, but also serve as a relatively accurate
statement of the modern consensus on human rights. 95 For
instance, the European Court of Human Rights articulated the
prevailing test for determining impartiality under the European
Convention and the ICCPR. 96
Further, the European Convention was also the first
instrument to give effect to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948) which recognized, for the first time, fundamental
and inalienable rights for all humanity, including “a fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the
determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal
charge against him.”97 In fact, this right of impartiality in the face
of any criminal charge is so fundamental and non-derogable that
most legal scholars regard it as forming part of customary

93. Id. at 6.
94. European Convention on Human Rights, COUNCIL OF E UROPE 9,
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F86-EB2A].
95. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d at 29.
96. Nuala Mole & Catharina Harby, The Right to A Fair Trial: A Guide to the
Implementation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3 HUMAN
RIGHTS HANDBOOKS 32 (Aug. 2006), http://www.refworld.org/ docid/ 49f180362.html
[https://perma.cc/MX8C-HYRG ]. Id. at 33 (citing Fey v. Austria, 24 Feb. 1993, para. 30)
(“[I]n deciding whether . . . there is a legitimate reason to fear that a particular [court] lacks
[independence or] impartiality, the standpoint of the accused is important but not decisive.
What is determinant is whether this fear can be held to be objectively justified.”).
97. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS 22 (Dec. 10, 1948),
http:// www.un.org/ en/ udhrbook/ pdf/ udhr_booklet_en_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/69L475WQ] (emphasis added).
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international law. 98 As such, “[g]uaranteeing the right of terrorist
suspects to a fair trial is critical for ensuring that anti-terrorism
measures respect the rule of law” as well as preventing a
derogation from a non-derogable right in violation of
international custom. 99

B. OBFUSCATION OF THE ICCPR BY THE
UNITED STATES
In furtherance of the ICCPR, as recognized by the United
States Supreme Court, “[r]egardless of the heinousness of the
crime charged, the apparent guilt of the offender, or the station in
life which he occupies,’ our system of justice demands trials that
are fair in both appearance and fact.”100 To this end, the federal
constitution, proper venue lies within the state and district in
which the alleged offense took place – something that is also
recognized by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure (“FRCP”) 18,
providing “[u]nless statue or these rules permit otherwise, the
government must prosecute an offense in a district where the
offense was committed.”101 However, this requirement is not
without limitation. Instead, the Sixth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution trumps this venue provision by requiring the trial
occur where “the jury guaranteed to the defendant [can] be
impartial.”102 This too is reflected in the FRCP which provides
“the court must transfer the proceeding against that defendant to
another district if the court is satisfied that so great a prejudice
against the defendant exists in the transferring district that the
98. News and Events: Digital Record of the UDHR, HCHR (2009), http://
www.ohchr.org/
EN/
NEWSEVENTS/
Pages/
DigitalrecordoftheUDHR.aspx
[https://perma.cc/UP22-7X8P]. As evidence of this custom, international humanitarian law
provides largely identical protections, in the context of armed conflicts. Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, UNITED N ATIONS COMMISSION ON H UMAN RIGHTS 16 (Feb.
7, 2005). For instance, as codified in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 as
well as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the denial of fair, regular, and
impartial trial constitutes a war crime. Rule 100. Fair Trial Guarantees, INT’L COMM. OF
THE
RED
CROSS,
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule100
[https://perma.cc/SQ6R-RXSU]; ROME STATUTE Art. 8(1)(a)(vi).
99. HCHR, supra note 74, at 38.
100. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d at 29 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. 5; 14.
101. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18. See U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 3; amend. VI.
102. Forty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 42 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV.
CRIM. PROC. 597 (2013).
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defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial there.” 103 In
other words, where an unfair prejudice exists, a court must
relinquish jurisdiction in favor of another, non-prejudiced venue.
Specifically, the FRCP even prevailed in terrorism cases.
For instance, in the 1995 trial of Timothy McVeigh, whose
bombing of an Oklahoma City, Oklahoma federal building
resulted in 684 injured and 167 dead (19 of whom were babies or
young children) was still guided by the ICCPR compliant FRCP,
even though at the time, it was considered the worst terrorist
attack in the country’s history. 104 Specifically, United States
courts followed standard procedure in granting 105 McVeigh’s
motion for a change of venue:
An accused need not establish the existence of a lynch
mob atmosphere to merit a change of venue: . . . ‘When
a spectacular crime had aroused community attention
and a suspect has been arrested, the possibility of an
unfair trial may originate in widespread publicity
describing facts, statements and circumstances which
tend to create a belief in his guilt’106
Further, as noted in McVeigh’s accomplice’s motion for a change
of venue:
Here, neither time nor close inquiry will erase the
physical, psychological, emotional, and economic
103. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a) (emphasis added). These constitutional and statutory
requirements have historically been relied upon by defendants where the nature of the
charges and the scope of the publicity has “tainted” the jury pool in a given district –
including in cases of terrorism. For instance, in the McVeigh trial, District Court Judge
Matsch, without hesitation or reservation, ordered a change of venue from the Western
District of Oklahoma to the District of Colorado because “[t]he effects of the explosion on
that community [were] so profound and pervasive that no detailed discussion of the evidence
[was] necessary. . . . The prejudice that may deny a fair trial is not limited to a bias or
discriminatory attitude. It includes an impairment of the deliberative process of deductive
reasoning from evidentiary facts resulting from an attribution to something not included in
the evidence. That something has its most powerful effect if it generates strong emotional
responses and fits into a pattern of normative values.” United States v. McVeigh, 918
F.Supp. 1467, 1470-72 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
104. See Sheryll Shariat, et al., Oklahoma City Bombing Injuries, OKLA. STATE DEP’T
OF HEALTH (Dec. 1998), https://www.ok.gov/ health2/ documents/ OKC_Bombing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YA24-FYNM]. See also Oklahoma City Bombing, HISTORY.COM, http://
www.history.com/ topics/ oklahoma- city- bombing [https://perma.cc/6Q85-CWGN].
105. McVeigh, 918 F.Supp. at 1469.
106. Brief in Support of Motion to Transfer, United States v. McVeigh, CR 95-110-A
(1995) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)) (citing People v. Williams, 774
P.2d 146, 155 (1989)).
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effects of the bombing on the citizens of Oklahoma.
These tangible connections intensify and are only
intensified by the effects of massive, highly prejudicial
pretrial publicity upon the citizens of Oklahoma. The
people of Oklahoma are exposed to this publicity not as
disinterested individuals, but as people who themselves
have been victimized by the bombing and who identify
themselves closely with those who are suffering from
the loss or injury of a loved one and with those who are
attempting to recover from the damage or destruction
of their home or business. Based on the combined
effects of pervasive, inflammatory, and incriminating
publicity [] along with the special interest that
Oklahomans have in the outcome of [the] trial . . . .107
However, a decade following McVeigh’s trial, the United States
was again attacked, with bombs at the finish line of the Boston
Marathon Bombing (discussed above); the end result of which
would be an obfuscation of the line drawn by the ICCPR and the
FRCP and a refusal to change venue even despite evidence of
overwhelming prejudice. 108 Specifically, the two-to-one majority
in In Re Tsarnev noted:
It is true that there has been ongoing media coverage of
the advent of the trial and petitioner’s pre-trial motions,
both locally and nationally. But that would be true
wherever trial is held, and the reporting has largely been
factual. These factors persuade us that petitioner has not
demonstrated a clear and indisputable right to relief
based on a presumption of prejudice from pretrial
publicity.109
Therefore, the First Circuit Court refused to comply with the
ICCPR and the FRCP in what the dissent called “trial-by-media
and raw emotion” that ensured the Defendant would not receive
“a fair trial [or be] accorded the utmost due process.” 110

107. See Motion for Change of Venue and Supporting Brief, United States v. McVeigh,
http:// www.goextranet.net/ Seminars/ Ohio/ Thurschwell/ Pretrial/ Venue.htm
[https://perma.cc/CD3X-4M8L].
108. See United States v. Tsarnaev, 157 F.Supp. 3d 57, 59 & n.1 (D. Mass. 2016).
109. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d 14, 22 (1st Cir. 2015).
110. Id. at 50 (Tourella, J., dissenting).
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C. TERRORISM’S COLLECTIVE IMPACT UPON
“FAIRNESS”
The United States’ seeming shift away from the ICCRP and
FRCP may likely be the result of bias resulting from continued
“third party victimization,” brought about by the 24-hour-newscycle’s collective coverage of terrorism attacks and threats to
Americans.111 Specifically, as noted above, 112 within four days
following the first bomb blast, most people in the United States
had engaged with at least one news report regarding the bombing
via some form of media source; this fact was even recognized by
the majority in In Re Tsarnev who noted “the events here, like the
1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the September 11,
2001 attacks, received national and international attention.
Petitioner does not deny that a jury anywhere in the country will
have been exposed to some level of media attention.”113
To this end, studies suggest “[m]edia coverage of collective
traumas may trigger psychological distress in individuals outside
the directly affected community.”114 Specifically, as noted above,
engagement with media coverage during a terrorist attack or a
mass-shooting may: (1) cause acute stress symptoms greater than
those who were at or near the actual attack; (2) trigger flashbacks
to different attacks or the same attack later in life; (3) encourage
subconscious fear conditioning; and (4) result in chronic stress
about the event from repeated exposure. 115 Thus, anyone with a
television connection can become a “third party victim” and
suffer trauma – including lasting psychological effects such as
PTSD, depression, anxiety, etc. – as a result of watching coverage
associated with a terrorist act. 116 Therefore, in accordance with
111. See E. Alison Holman, et al., Media’s Role in Broadcasting Acute Stress
Following the Boston Marathon Bombings, 111 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 93, 93 (2013).
112. See supra note 20.
113. In Re Tsarnev, 780 F.3d at 16.
114. Holman, supra note 112.
115. U.C. Irvine, Prolonged Viewing of Boston Marathon Bombings Media Coverage
Tied to Acute Stress (Dec. 9, 2013), https:// news.uci.edu/ press-releases/ prolonged-viewingof- boston- marathon- bombings- media- coverage- tied- to- acute- stress/
[https://perma.cc/D8VL-LUYD].
116. See Holman, supra note 112, at 93. Specifically, as noted in one study following
the Boston Marathon Bombing:
[M]edia exposure in the week after the bombings was associated with higher
acute stress than direct exposure to the bombings . . . Repeatedly engaging
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traditional due process interpretations, such “third party victims”
should be rendered ineligible for jury service. 117
Importantly, these observations are not just limited to the
attacks on the Boston Marathon, instead, similar effects were
perceived following the terrorist attacks of: the Oklahoma City
Bombing,118 September 11, 2001119 and the Sandy Hook School
shooting.120 Thus, the effects of wide-spread “third party
victimization” appear whenever there is a terrorist attack or other
instance of wide-spread manmade violence. 121 In explaining this
phenomenon, some psychologists hypothesize:
Repeatedly watching disturbing images may also affect
threat appraisals and may contribute to stress-related
symptoms. Because rumination keeps the mind focused
on a past negative event, media exposure may
perpetuate activation of fear circuitry in the brain,
especially in the early aftermath of the event when
memory consolidation is most pronounced; this could
contribute to the abnormal consolidation of fear
conditioning that is associated with development of
acute and PTS responses. Unlike direct exposure to a
collective trauma, which can end when the acute phase

with trauma-related media content for several hours daily shortly after
collective trauma may prolong acute stress experiences and promote
substantial stress-related symptomatology. Mass media may become a conduit
that spreads negative consequences of community trauma beyond directly
affected communities.
Id. (emphasis added).
117. See generally Oregon State Bar, Handbook for Jurors, https:// www.osbar.org/
public/ jurorhandbook.htm [https://perma.cc/7NE9-JNL4] (noting victims have “actual
bias” in adjudications of their alleged offender).
118. Pfefferbaum B, et al., Television Exposure in Children after a Terrorist Incident,
64 PSYCHIATRY, 202, 207–09 (2001).
119. Jennifer Ahern, et al., Television Images and Psychological Symptoms After the
September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 65 PSYCHIATRY 2002, 289–300 (2002). Participants “who
repeatedly saw ‘people falling or jumping from the towers of the World Trade Center’ [on
television] had higher prevalence of PTSD . . . and depression . . . than those who did not.”
Id. Another study found that “[f]orty-four percent of the adults reported one or more
substantial symptoms of stress; 90 percent had one or more symptoms to at least some
degree. Respondents throughout the country reported stress symptoms.” Mark A. Schuster,
et al. A National Survey of Stress Reactions After the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks,
345 N ENGL J MED. 1507, 1507 (2001).
120. See Holman, supra note 112, at 94.
121. See id.
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of the event is over, media exposure keeps the acute
stressor active and alive in one’s mind.122
To this end, “[g]iven the significance of media in our daily
lives, its impact on our health is likely to grow,” including the
bias it produces.123 As a result, as terrorist attacks continue, it is
likely that: (1) more States will turn a “blind eye” to the dictates
of the ICCRP as a matter of judicial policy governing terrorism
trials, and (2) populations (and jury pools) will become
increasingly “de facto prejudiced” by the effects of media
coverage and the “third party victimization” it causes. 124
Therefore, in compliance with the ICCRP, proper venue must lie
with an independent, unaffected body – the International Criminal
Court.

THE SOLUTION PART I:
REDEFINING “CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY” TO
PERMIT ICC JURISDICTION OVER TERRORISM
ADJUDICATIONS
In 1872, International Committee of the Red Cross cofounder, Gustav Moynier, first proposed a permanent
international court to adjudicate crimes committed during the
Franco-Prussian war.125 Moynier’s proposal went largely
overlooked until 1919, when the drafters of the Treaty of
Versailles, unsuccessfully called for the creation of an
international court to adjudicate war crimes committed during the
First World War. 126 While Moynier’s proposal was laudable, it
could not overcome concerns of state sovereignty. 127 Instead, it
would take nearly seventy-five years until Moynier’s proposal
first became a partial-reality with the creation of ad hoc

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. History of the ICC, COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., http:// archive.iccnow.org/
?mod= icchistory [https://perma.cc/5MEZ-GTEF].
126. Id.
127. André Durand, Gustav Moynier and the Peace Societies, 314 INT. L REV. OF THE
RED CROSS (Oct. 31, 1996), https:// www.icrc.org/ eng/ resources/ documents/ article/ other/
57jnaw.htm [https://perma.cc/4YZE-CJB7].
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Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals following the Second World
War.128
Following the Second World War and the resulting Tokyo
and Nuremburg ad hoc international tribunals, the United Nations
was established in 1945 in part, to prevent future, similar
atrocities.129 Within one year of its creation, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which “called for criminals
to be tried ‘by such international penal tribunal[s] as may have
jurisdiction’ . . . [and] invited the International Law Commission
‘to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an
international judicial organ for the trials of persons charged with
genocide.’”130 However, these efforts were largely abandoned in
the 1950’s in response to the Cold War, despite near agreement
on an “International Code of Crimes.” 131
Following the end of the Cold War, in 1989, the United
Nations General Assembly requested the International Law
Commission to resume the creation of an international
adjudicatory organ. 132 The need for such a body was underscored,
within a matter of years, in which the United Nations Security
Council was forced to establish separate ad hoc tribunals in
response to conflicts in Bosnia, Croatia, and Rwanda.133 As a
result of this pressure, in 1994, the International Law Commission
presented a drafted statute calling for the creation of the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”). 134 After years of debate
and revision, on July 17, 1998, representatives from 160 member
nations convened in Rome to vote on the adoption of the ICC. 135
As a result, over 125 years after Moynier’s first proposal, the
128. Christian Tomuschat, The Legacy of Nuremberg, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 830, 830,
832 & n. 7 (2006).
129. Id. at 837.
130. U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(1999),
http://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm
[https://perma.cc/N3QM-GH42]
(quotations omitted); U.N. Treaty Series, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide at 282–83 (1951), https:// treaties.un.org/ doc/ publication/ unts/
volume%2078/ volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZM8-BZPR]; See History
of the ICC, supra note 126.
131. See History of the ICC, supra note 126.
132. See U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, supra note 131.
133. See History of the ICC, supra note 126.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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Rome Statute was adopted with 120 nations voting in favor, 7
nations voting against (including the United States, Israel, China,
Iraq, and Qatar), and 21 nations abstaining. 136 Upon reaching its
ratification threshold, the Rome Statute entered into force on July
1, 2002 and investigations into crimes within the limited
jurisdiction of the Court began almost immediately.137

A. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE
ICC138
In addition to establishing the ICC, the Rome Statute also
codified the applicable criminal law within the court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. 139 Specifically, Article 5 of the Rome Statute
limits the jurisdiction of the Court “to the most serious crimes of
concern to the internal community as a whole,” 140 including:
genocide (i.e. murder, causing seriously bodily harm, etc. “with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group”);141 crimes against humanity (i.e. murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture,
rape, etc. “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population”); 142 and war crimes (i.e.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. This discussion is limited to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction in that the
United States is not a party to the Rome Statute, thus the ICC does not retain subject matter
jurisdiction unless “the crime took place on the territory of a State Party or a State otherwise
accepting the jurisdiction of the Court, the United Nations Security Council has referred the
situation to the Prosecutor, irrespective of the nationality of the accused or the location of
the crime,” or the United States accepts jurisdiction of the court. See How the Court Works,
supra note 38. Thus, while a territorial jurisdiction analysis may render this analysis moot,
these alternatives to territorial jurisdiction—however unlikely—provide a path for the
subject matter jurisdiction analysis to proceed.
139. See ROME STATUTE, supra note 38, at Art. 5.
140. Id. at Art. 5(1).
141. ROME STATUTE, supra note 38, at Art. 6(a)-(e). “[A]lthough the negotiators of
the Rome Statute contemplated adding many crimes to the Court’s jurisdiction including
terrorism, drug trafficking, hostage-taking, and aggression, it was ultimately decided that it
would be preferable to begin with universal ‘core crimes’ defined in treaties or found in
customary international law . . . .” Leila Sadat, The International Criminal Court, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL L AW 137, 145 (William A.
Schabas ed., 2016).
142. ROME STATUTE, supra note 38, at Art. 7(1)(a)-(k).
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grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 such as willful
killing, torture, deprivation of a fair and regular trial, taking
hostages, etc. committed “against persons or property protected
under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention” as part
of a plan, policy, or large-scale commission).143 However,
despite the fact terrorism, in its contemporary practice, “is always
and everywhere in violation of international law,” 144 the Rome
Statute does not explicitly grant the Court jurisdiction over acts
of terrorism nor does it define the term (see definitional
discussion above). 145 As such, the Court may only prosecute
terrorist acts if they fall within the elements of genocide, crimes
against humanity, or war crimes as enumerated in the Rome
Statute.146
To that end, as early as the 1919, the Commission of the
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement
of Penalties, terrorism has been incorporated within the definition
of “crimes against humanity.” 147 In 1945, the Nuremberg Trials
became the first to adjudicate the “crime against humanity of
‘systematic terrorism,’”148 specifically, in rendering its verdict,
the International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) found:
With regard to crimes against humanity, there is no
doubt whatever that political opponents were murdered
in Germany before the war, and that many of them were
kept in concentration camps [(deemed by the tribunal
as a terrorist tool to implement a policy of crimes
143. Id. at Art. 8(1)-(2)(a)(viii). Article 5 of the Rome Statute also anticipates the
Court will acquire jurisdiction over “the crime of aggression” in the future. Id. at Art.
5(1)(d)-(2). While the Assembly of States Parties have agreed that “a ‘crime of aggression’
means the planning, preparation, initiation[,] or execution [of an act] [(i.e. invasion, military
occupation, annexation, etc.)] us[ing] [] armed force[s] by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity[,] or political independence of another State,” the Court may not begin
exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the crime until after January 1, 2017 when the
Amendment must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the States Parties to the Rome
Statue and ratified by at least 30 States Parties. Id. at Art. 11(1)-(2); Handbook: Ratification
and Implementation of the Kampala Amendments to the Rome Statute of the ICC, GLOBAL
INSTITUTE
FOR
THE
PREVENTION
OF
AGGRESSION
(June
2012),
https://crimeofaggression.info/documents /1/handbook.pdf.
144. Darren C. Zook, “Terrorism,” in 4 The Oxford International Encyclopedia of
Peace 145, 145 (Nigel J. Young ed., 2010).
145. Cf. How The Court Works, supra note 38.
146. ROME STATUTE, supra note 38, at Art. 5.
147. Arnold, supra note 73, at 987-88.
148. Id. at 980-81.
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against humanity)] in circumstances of great horror and
cruelty. The policy of terror was certainly carried out on
a vast scale, and in many cases was organised and
systematic.149
Thus, the IMT held that terrorist acts, in order to be considered a
crime against humanity, the act(s) “are characterised by either
their seriousness and their savagery, or by their magnitude, or by
the circumstance that they were part of a system of terrorist acts,
or that they were a link in a deliberately pursued policy against
certain groups of the population.” 150 In other words, IMT
jurisprudence unequivocally established that terrorism falls
within the definition of “crimes against humanity” under the
customary law when the alleged offense is: (1) particularly savage
or serious, (2) large in scale, (3) part of a series of attacks, or (4)
committed with discriminatory purpose. 151
More recently, in Prosecutor v. Galic (2003), the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”) convicted a defendant for the war crime of terror
against the civilian population in Sarajevo based upon the
precedential foundation of the Nuremburg Trials. 152 However,
Galic, with respect to its war crimes analysis, represented a
significant deviation from ICTY jurisprudence in which,
generally, “[t]he Trial Chambers characterises . . . the crime[ ] of
terror . . . as constituting crimes against humanity, that is,
persecution and inhumane acts” under explicit holding of the
IMT.153
However, the IMT and ICTY iterations of the international
customary law were not explicitly codified in the Rome Statute.154
Instead, during the Rome Conference, “several delegations
argued for the inclusion of terrorism in the jurisdiction of the
Court as a separate crime,” but a majority of States disagreed
149. Id. at 989 (quoting Judgement: The Law Relating to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity, YALE L AW SCHOOL: T HE AVALON PROJECT (2008),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judlawre.asp [https://perma.cc/ZF93-NWRZ].
150. Niemann, supra note 42, at 176 (quoting Special Court of Cessation in the
Netherlands (Apr. 11, 1949), Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (1949) No 435, 747).
151. See id.
152. See HCHR, supra note 74, at 14-15.
153. Arnold, supra note 73, at 990; Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-39,
Judgment, 607 (August 2, 2001).
154. Compare Arnold, supra note 73, at 990-91 with ROME S TATUTE, supra note 38,
at Art. 5(1).
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because of the lack of a commonly agreed upon definition (see
above).155 As a result, the Rome Statute does not currently
include “terrorism” as a separate crime, yet an attack may still
constitute a crime against humanity within the jurisdiction of the
ICC only if it is committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population. 156 However, this
jurisdictional hook is significantly more limited that that
originally articulated by the IMT, specifically: terrorism falls
within the definition of “crimes against humanity” when it is
particularly savage or serious, large in scale, part of a series of
attacks, or committed with discriminatory purpose. 157

B. PROPOSED STATUTORY REVISIONS TO
“CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY”
The limited jurisdictional hook of the ICC over acts of
terrorism falling within the definition of “crimes against
humanity” is predicated upon Article 7(1) of the Rome Statue,
necessitating the enumerated crimes be “committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian
population.”158 According to the statute’s interpretive language,
this requires “the multiple commission of acts . . . against any
civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy to commit such attack.” 159 While this
continuality and organizational requirement, is arguably
applicable to liberation or ideocentric organizations such Irish
Republican Army, Islam State of Iraq and Greater Syria, and AlQaeda,160 it seemingly would not apply to non-organized actors
such as Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev (even though their acts
would have likely fallen within the IMT’s interpretation of crimes
against humanity).
As such, to effectuate the precedent established by the IMT
and expand the ICC jurisdiction to include terrorism within the
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

HCHR, supra note 74, at 14.
Id. at 14-15.
See Niemann, supra note 42, at 176.
ROME STATUTE, supra note 38, at Art. 7(1).
Id. at Art. 7(2)(a).
Country Reports on Terrorism, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE: OFFICE OF THE
COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM (April 30, 2007), https://www.state.gov/j/
ct/rls/crt/2006/82738.htm [https://perma.cc/3WEF-43ZK].
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meaning of “crimes against humanity,” the operative language
articulated in Article 7(1), should be amended:
From: “For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against
humanity’ means any of the following acts when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population . . . .”161
To: “For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against
humanity’ means any of the following acts when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directedly against any civilian population . . . .”
Further, the interpretive language, articulated in Article
7(2)(a), should be amended
From: “the multiple commission of acts . . . against any
civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a
State or organizational policy to commit such
attack . . . .”162
To: the multiple commission of any acts . . . against any
civilian population, or pursuant to or in furtherance of
a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.”
These revisions would not only give effect to the broad
interpretation established by IMT (while retaining
complementarity), but also avoid the controversy associated with
explicitly defining “terrorism” in the Statute.

THE SOLUTION PART II:
DECLINING “COMPLIMENTARY JURISDICTION”
OVER TERRORISM ADJUDICATIONS
The preamble of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (“Rome Statute”) codifies international
customary law, providing “it is the duty of every State to exercise
its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
crimes . . . .”163 However, Article I of the Rome Statute also
establishes the ICC as a permanent institution with “the power to
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes
161. ROME STATUTE, supra note 38, at Art. 7(1).
162. Id. at Art. 7(2)(a).
163. Id. at Preamble.
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of international concern . . . .”164
To avoid any resulting
jurisdictional conflicts, the ICC’s jurisdiction is subject to
limitation. Specifically:
The [ICC] may exercise jurisdiction if [t]he accused is
a national of a State Party or a State otherwise accepting
the jurisdiction of the Court; [t]he crime took place on
the territory of a State party or a State otherwise
accepting jurisdiction of the Court; or [t]he United
Nations Security Council has referred the situation to
the Prosecutor, irrespective of the nationality of the
accused or the location of the crime. 165
Even when the court may exercise jurisdiction, it may decline to
exercise its power based on the “principle of
complementarity.”166 Under this principle, the Court will decline
jurisdiction over a case if it “has been or is being investigated or
prosecuted by a State with jurisdiction.”167 However, this
exception is limited if the “prosecuting State is unwilling or
unable to genuinely [ ] carry out the investigation or
prosecution.”168 As such, despite being able to assert jurisdiction,
the ICC will decline jurisdiction if a State with complementary
jurisdiction has or is, in the largely subjective judgment of the
Court, “legitimate” investigation or prosecution individuals
charged with genocide, crimes against humanity, or war
crimes.169
Not only is such a policy not in keeping with the wide-spread
effects of terrorism, which renders a “genuinely” fair trial nearly
impossible at the State-level, but abolishing the ICC’s recognition
of complimentary jurisdiction in terrorism prosecutions is of
164. Id. at Art. 1.
165. How the Court Works, supra note 38. Specifically, under the Rome Statute, the
ICC retains jurisdiction over “those directly responsible for committing the crimes as well
as others who may be liable for the crimes, for example by aiding, abetting or otherwise
assisting in the commission of a crime. The latter group also includes military commanders
or other superiors whose responsibility is defined in the Statute.” International Crimes and
Accountability: A Beginner’s Introduction to the Duty to Investigate, Prosecute and Punish,
DIAKONIA (October 2013), https://www.diakonia.se/ globalassets/ documents/ ihl/ihlresources-center/international-crimes-and-accountability-a-beginners-introduction-to-theduty-to-investigate-prosecute-and-punish.pdf [https://perma.cc/NPC5-LYGM].
166. International Crimes and Accountability, supra note 166.
167. Id.
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Id.
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paramount importance now that most states, with the exception of
Germany, have largely abandoned the controversial concept of
“universal jurisdiction,” in which, largely as a matter of
custom,170 a third-party country can “try and punish perpetrators
of some crimes so heinous that they amount to crimes against the
whole of humanity, regardless of where they occurred or the
nationality of the victim or perpetrator.” 171

A. THE RISE OF “UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION”
“Although almost two-thirds of all states have national
legislation permitting their courts to exercise universal
jurisdiction over certain conduct committed abroad amounting to
one or more of the following crimes: war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide, torture, extrajudicial executions or
‘disappearances,’”172 very few States have taken action under
their respective statutory grants.173 However, in 2002, Germany
began asserting jurisdiction over international cases involving at
least some German connection – be it as a victim, offender, or a
third party affected by genocide, war crimes, or crimes against
humanity.174
In many respects, German “universal jurisdiction,” was
predicated upon Spain’s historical allowance for its national
courts (Audiencia Nacional) to pursue criminal cases outside of
its territorial jurisdiction since 1985.175 Pursuant to Organic Law
6/1985 on the Judiciary (Ley Organica del Pder Judicial) Article
23 § 4, Spanish Criminal Courts could assert jurisdiction over
170. See Rule 157. States Have the Right to Vest Universal Jurisdiction in Their
National Courts over War Crimes, INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter44_rule157
[https://perma.cc/64XW-6XNX].
171. Questions and Answers on the ICC and Universal Jurisdiction, AMERICAN NGO
COALITION FOR T HE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://docs.wixstatic.com/
ugd/e13974_eb835efd38ac47e4917bbf7f283e4564.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WA8-CEBJ].
172. Universal Jurisdiction: The Duty to Enact and Enforce Jurisdiction, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL (Sept. 2001), https:// www.amnesty.org/ download/ Documents/ 128000/
ior530172001en.pdf [https://perma.cc/478R-S3SC].
173. Id.
174. Helen Zuber, Universal Jurisdiction? Spain’s ‘World Court’ May Be Restricted,
SPIEGEL INTERNATIONAL (June 2, 2009), http://www.spiegel.de/ international/ world/
universal- jurisdiction- spain- s- world- court- may- be- restricted- a-628112.html
[https://perma.cc/FB33-MCSQ].
175. Id.
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“offenses of an international nature or with an international
dimension.”176 This provision was broadly conceived to provide
Spanish courts with “absolute jurisdiction, no links with Spain
were required and no criteria of subsidiarity applied; furthermore,
anybody could file a claim.” 177 Spain justified this unparalleled
jurisdiction as a “necessity” following the Nuremberg Trials in
which a “general consensus [] formed . . . that acts of horror
should [not] go unpunished, especially when they [cannot] be
prosecuted in the country where they occurred.” 178
In the years following the enactment of Organic Law 6/1985,
Spain opened several investigations into international offenses –
most notably against former Chilean dictator General Augusto
Pinochet.179 Spain’s investigation into Pinochet began in 1996
when a non-governmental organization – the Spanish Union of
Progressive Prosecutors – filed a complaint in the Spanish courts
“accusing members of the Argentine military . . . of genocide,
terrorism, and other crimes . . . .”180 Despite several requests
from judges, Chile refused to extradite Pinochet or make him
available for questioning – causing the case to stall. 181 However,
the case regained new life when Pinochet, then age 82, traveled
to London for medical care in 1997. 182
Pinochet’s arrival in London for medical care sparked a
year-long diplomatic and legal battle, which ultimately
culminated in Pinochet’s arrest in October 1998 at London Bridge
Hospital on an Interpol Red Notice alleging the commission of
numerous international atrocities between 1973 and 1983. 183
However, following Pinochet’s arrest, the Chilean government

176. Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, art. 23(4) (Spain).
177. Rosa Ana Alija Fernandez, The 2014 Reform of Universal Jurisdiction in Spain
From All to Nothing, 9 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE S TRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK 717,
717 (2014).
178. Zuber, supra note 175.
179. Daniel Del Pino, Spain, Universal Judge, PUBLIC (June 5, 2009),
http://www.publico.es/internacional/espana-juez-universal.html
[https://perma.cc/KE353KXP] (citation based on English translation).
180. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35
NEW ENG. L. REV. 311, 311 (2001).
181. David Connett et al., Pinochet Arrested in London, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 17,
1998), http:// www.theguardian.com/ world/ 1998/ oct/ 18/ pinochet.chile
[https://perma.cc/NG38-GR5Z].
182. Id.
183. Id.
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sought to enjoin Pinochet’s extradition to Spain asserting
Pinochet was traveling on a diplomatic passport and subject to
diplomatic immunity.184 After a legal battle that ultimately
reached the House of Lords twice, English court’s held,
following pressures from the United Sates and then Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher (who was a close, personal friend of
Pinochet) that: (1) Pinochet was not entitled to diplomatic
immunity because certain international crimes allowed for a
piercing of the “diplomatic veil”; and (2) Pinochet could only be
extradited for crime committed after 1988 – the year which the
United Kingdom recognized the UN Convention Against
torture.185 Since the arrest warrant was for alleged violations of
international law between 1973 and 1983, the United Kingdom
could not hold or extradite Pinochet to Spain. 186 As such,
Pinochet was ultimately released and returned to Chile a free man.

B. THE FALL OF “UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION”
In the years following the Pinochet debacle, despite dozens
of on-going investigation and some successful prosecutions,
international pressure eventually forced Spain to reduce the scope
of Organic Law 6/1985. 187 The first limitation of Organic Law
6/1985 was imposed in October 2005 by Spain’s Constitutional
Court decided that Spain’s criminal courts could not maintain
“absolute” jurisdiction, but could maintain “universal
jurisdiction” in which “judges in Madrid had a duty to pursue
breaches of international agreements – like the Geneva
Convention on handling prisoners of war, or treaties against
184. Id.
185. The Extradition of General Augusto Pinochet, HUMAN R IGHTS WATCH (Oct. 14,
1999),
https://www.hrw.org/news/1999/10/14/extradition-general-augusto-pinochet
[https://perma.cc/U7EC-HDGA]. Interestingly, the House of Lords did not address nor did
the Chilean government raise the issue of Spain’s ex post facto application of Organic Law
6/1985. Id. Specifically, Interpol’s warrant sought Pinochet’s extradition to Spain for crimes
occurring between 1973 and 1983 – two years prior to Spain’s adoption of Organic Law
6/1985. Connett et al., supra note 182. Instead, the decision to not extradite was predicated
on the ex post facto application of UK law.
186. Andrea Gattini, Pinochet Cases, OXFORD PUB. INT. L AW (June 2007),
http://opil.ouplaw.com/ view/ 10.1093/ law:epil/ 9780199231690/ law-9780199231690e859 [https://perma.cc/SJ5J-BUMM].
187. Soeren Kern, Spain Rethinks Universal Jursidiction, GATESTONE INSTITUTE
(Jan. 31, 2014), https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4149/spain-universal-jurisdiction
[https://perma.cc/JHK3-5P8C].
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genocide or torture – which Spain had signed[;] [however,] [a]ll
the justices had to determine was that no other court in the world
was already trying the same crime.” 188 In so doing, Spain adopted
a “principle of complementarity” which was nearly identical to
that of the ICC. Yet, despite this limitation, prosecutions
continued largely unhindered until 2009. 189
In 2009, a Spanish court sparked international backlash
when it announced several high-profile investigations into the
activities of Israeli and United States nationals. 190 Specifically,
in January 2009, Spanish Judge Fernando Andreu announced the
investigation into seven top Israeli military and government
official for crimes against humanity. 191 In March of that year
Judge Baltasar Garzon announced the investigation of six former
Bush administration officials for facilitating torture at the
Guantanamo Bay detention center. 192 Finally, in May 2009,
Judge Santiago Pedraz announced formal charges against three
United State soldiers for crimes against humanity relating to the
shelling of a Baghdad hotel. 193 A diplomatic fight then ensued,
led by the United States, in which, ultimately, the Spanish
Congress of Deputies and the Spanish Senate voted to restrict
Organic Law 6/1985.194
As the first major legislative amendment of Organic Law
6/1985, Organic Law 1/2009, provided several significant
limitations on the country’s “universal jurisdiction.” 195
Specifically, Spanish courts could only exercise of jurisdiction if:
(1) the alleged perpetrator was within the territorial jurisdiction
of Spain, (2) the case involve Spanish victims - including those of
Spanish descent, or (3) there was some other relevant link
connecting the offense/case to Spain. 196 While the third
provision, was somewhat vague, “[s]uch relevant link has
been . . . described as historical, social, cultural, legal, political,
and other similar relations (belonging in the past to the same
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
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political unit, sharing a common language with relevant cultural
nexus, participating in political international organisations [sic]
that must be analysed [sic] on a case-by-case basis.”197 As a result
of Organic Law 1/2009, which applied to pending cases as well
as future cases, the cases involving United States and Israeli
nationals were summarily dismissed. 198
Within the limitations imposed by Organic Law 1/2009,
Spanish courts still continued opening dozens of high-profile
investigations involving international law.199 In October 2013,
Spain again shocked the international community when Spanish
High Court Judge Ismael Moreno accepted a case filed by the
Madrid-domiciled Tibetan Support Committee and the
Barcelona-domiciled Tibet House Fund and found sufficient
evidence to issue arrest warrants for former Chinese President
Jiang Semin, former Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng, and three
other high-ranking Chinese officials. 200 Under the arrest warrants
which claimed the parties “aimed at eliminating the uniqueness
and existence of Tibet as a country, imposing martial law,
carrying out forced deportations, mass sterilization campaigns
and torture of dissidents,” the official could be arrested when
traveling to any country with which Spain has an extradition
treaty.201 In response to the arrest warrants, the Chinese
parliament officially condemned the action and urged Spain to
“face up to China’s solemn position, change the wrong decision,
repair the severe damage, and refrain from sending wrong signals
to the Tibetan independences forces, and hurting China-Spain
relations.”202
Almost immediately following China’s condemnation,
Spanish lawmakers responded to avoid an international incident
and economic reprisals. 203 Specifically, lawmakers sought to
avoid damaging its trade relationship with China – which is
Spain’s biggest trading partner outside of the EU and is the
second largest holder of Spanish debt – in the same way that
Norway did “after the Norwegian Nobel Committee in 2010
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
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awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, a dissident serving
an 11-year prison term in China.”204 In response, Spanish
lawmakers drafted, presented, and passed Organic Law 1/2014
within two months. 205 Spanish law now provides that that the
country’s criminal courts may only assert jurisdiction when:
[I]n cases of genocide, crimes against humanity or war
crimes, . . . the alleged perpetrator [must] be a Spanish
national, a foreigner who habitually resides in Spain or
a foreigner who happens to be in Spain and whom the
Spanish authorities have refused to extradite . . . . for
crimes of torture and enforced disappearance if the
alleged perpetrator is a Spanish citizen or, the victim is
a Spanish citizen at the time the act was committed and
the alleged perpetrator is on Spanish territory [, and] for
crimes not covered by the law itself, Spain shall respect
the rules of jurisdiction provided by treaties to which it
is a party.206
Further, the revised law prevents non-victim third parties, such as
the Tibetan Support Committee and the Tibet House Fund, from
filing cases before Spanish criminal courts.207 In essence,
Organic Law 1/2014 stripped Spain of its “universal jurisdiction,”
implicitly deferring instead to the use of “universal jurisdiction”
by other States or the ICC. 208

C. THE REMAINING JURISDICTIONAL VOID
With the collapse of “universal jurisdiction” resulting from
Organic Law 1/2014, and the exception of German efforts, the
ICC stands alone in its ability to provide a neutral, third-party
adjudication of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide,
the crime of aggression, etc. 209 However, its ability to hear such
204. Id.
205. Fernandez, supra note 178, at 718.
206. International Committee of the Red Cross, Organic Law 1/2014 Modifying the
Organic Law 6/1985 of the Judicial Power, on Universal Jurisdiction, https:// www.icrc.org/
applic/
ihl/
ihl-nat.nsf/
implementingLaws.xsp?
documentId=26DF035F7A2CB224C1257E6C002D426C&action=openDocument&xp_cou
ntrySelected=ES&xp_topicSelected=GVAL-992BU6&from=state [https://perma.cc/84A7BBJ5].
207. See id.
208. See Fernandez, supra note 178, at 718.
209. See supra Part II.
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cases is significantly curtailed by “principle of complementarity”
which requires a subject judgment of whether a State-party “is
“unwilling or unable” to genuinely carry out the investigation or
prosecution.”210 As a result, if “crimes against humanity” is
redefined to include terrorism (as proposed above), the Court’s
jurisdiction will be a subjective determination, much like that in
In Re Tsarnaev.211 Therefore, as the only remaining viable thirdparty adjudicator, the Court must de facto decline to abide by the
“complimentary jurisdiction” rule in cases of terrorism as no
target-state is “able to genuinely carryout the investigation or
prosecution” in keeping with the Court’s charge to abide by “the
principles of due process recognized by international law.” 212

CONCLUSION
As discussed in this analysis, there is no universally accepted
definition of “terrorism,” nor is there agreement upon the scope
of terrorism’s civilian impact (i.e. individuals, groups/sects,
and/or the population as a whole). Unfortunately, many States,
including the United States and Iraq, as well as the Sixth
Committee of the United Nations, appear to be trending away
from statutory schemes embracing the Geneva Conventions’
recognition that even “targeted terrorism” affects the population
of a State as a whole; a fact supported by emerging data on
secondary victimization in the age of the twenty-four-hour news
cycle. Further, prevailing social science data concludes that not
only does terrorism result in widespread secondary victimization,
but it also cultivates significant anti-defendant bias among the
population. As a result, the fundamental right to a fair and
impartial trial in cases of terrorism is becoming increasingly
impossible to realize, especially within a target country (as
exemplified by the trial of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev in the United
States). Thus, given the lack of “universal jurisdiction”
alternatives, international tribunals – primarily the ICC – must be
empowered to assume subject-matter jurisdiction through the
210. How the Court Works, supra note 38.
211. Id.
212. ROME STATUTE, supra note 38, at Art. 17 § 1(a), 2; see supra Part I and Part II.
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expansion of existing, codified jurisdictional “hooks,” such as
“crimes against humanity,” while retaining internationally
accepted norms of “due process.”

